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U.S. Defense and the International Situation



U.S. Defense and the International Situation

By
James R. Schlesinger
Secretary of Defense



The first issue we must face in our planning is how, at any given time, the international situation should affect the shape of the U.S. defense establishment. It is a well-worn truism that our forces exist to support our foreign policy, but what operationally does that mean? Are there specific elements in the external world that create the need for military capabilities, overseas deployments, military assistance, and continuing programs of research and development? When and how should change in the international situation justify alterations in the size and composition of our force structure?

A number of factors external to the United States directly affect our planning. I shall review them only briefly here.

Interests

The divisions brought on by our involvement in Southeast Asia have left an understandable desire on the part of many Americans for some respite from foreign troubles and responsibilities. But recent events in the Middle East have sharply reminded us that the United States still has very large and important moral, political, and economic interests outside its borders, and that these interests may require military protection. Recent events have also underlined the extent to which distant troubles can affect and even jeopardize the United States itself unless our defenses are strong.

Opposing Capabilities

It is no secret that, in the past, certain nations have shown themselves hostile to the worldwide interests of the United States and have acquired the military capabilities to threaten them—and us. We live in the constant knowledge that the Soviet Union, at any time, could launch a nuclear attack—large or small—on the United States itself, and that the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) could well develop at least a modest capability for such an attack during the next decade.

It is generally agreed that some relationship must exist between these capabilities and the defense posture of the United States. Indeed, we consider it fundamental that at all times we must have available a sufficiency of ready strategic offensive forces to retaliate against a Soviet nuclear attack.

The Soviet Union, its partners in the Warsaw Pact, and the P.R.C. also maintain large and ready general purpose

forces. These forces are, in fact, the most usable elements of their considerable and diversified power. It is noteworthy, however, that many Americans do not insist on a comparable availability and readiness for U.S. and allied general purpose forces, and even suggest that in a period of nuclear parity we should reduce them below their current levels.

It would be economically intolerable, inefficient and certainly undesirable for the United States by itself to develop a force structure that mirrors this entire range—the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the P.R.C.—of potential threats. In any event, the Soviet Union is the only other superpower in the international political arena. Accordingly, it is primarily in light of Soviet capabilities that we must judge the adequacy of our own nuclear and non-nuclear deterrent forces.

Commitments and Contingencies

Another factor shaping our overall defense posture is the large number of formal commitments for mutual defense that the United States has accumulated since World War II. Not counting the collective security provisions of the United Nations Charter, we are allied to more than 40 nations in nine multilateral and bilateral treaties. In addition, we have informal but nonetheless real commitments to other nations that our defense programs must take into account.

These commitments are important to both our nuclear and our non-nuclear force planning. In varying degrees they reflect an obligation to maintain military capabilities in support of our allies. They give us insights about the types of contingencies that could arise and about the threats that require deterrence. They also enable us to share the burden of collective security with a number of other nations. In some instances they lead us to provide military assistance as a substitute for the maintenance of additional U.S. forces and their deployment abroad.

Above all, when worldwide equilibrium and orderly change constitute basic U.S. objectives, commitments and contingencies tell us where points of potential pressure exist and where, for purposes of deterrence, specific balances of military power must be maintained. On that score, I believe that we must keep a visible strategic nuclear balance, contribute to a number of regional balances—in Europe and Asia—and help to ensure the freedom of the seas, as has been the long tradition of the United States.

Planning the Forces

In light of these factors, we can arrive at the specific nuclear and non-nuclear forces required for a particular contingency. But those factors do not automatically dictate what overall force structure the United States should maintain in this period of transition. Not only does the final calculus depend on a number of additional considerations, including various perceptions of the key military balances, it also turns on our assessment of the international environment and the degree of menace that it poses to our essential interests.

All through the previous decade—quite apart from our special buildup for Southeast Asia—my predecessors interpreted these factors to mean that we should maintain active and reserve forces (nuclear and non-nuclear) sufficient to deter hostilities by:

- Giving us counterforce and damage-limiting options, as well as the ability to retaliate with devastating power against cities, even after a surprise nuclear attack by the U.S.S.R.;
- Coping simultaneously with two major contingencies (one in Europe and one in Asia) and one minor contingency; and
- Maintaining superiority in a war at sea and control the sea lines of communication necessary to the support of our forces and allies overseas.

Admittedly, the assessment of the international situation during that decade was more pessimistic than our current estimate. But it also is noteworthy that the large active forces then at our disposal were intended in most contingencies to operate in conjunction with allies



A Soviet "W" class twin-cylinder type guided missile submarine surfaces during operations at sea.

and to receive early reinforcement from our reserves and the draft. Indeed, despite a peacetime military establishment of 2.7 million men and women, we added another 900,000 (starting in 1965) both to strengthen our forces in Southeast Asia and to maintain our capability to deal with other contingencies. Only in 1969, with the advent of this Administration, did a significant reduction in the force begin to take place.

Current Forces and Their Costs

Since that time, estimates of the international situation have become more optimistic, in large measure because of initiatives taken by the United States. To the extent that we now consider the political environment less threatening, it is largely because President Nixon terminated the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, made successful diplomatic overtures to Peking and Moscow, achieved agreements in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) (with the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Offensive Agreement), and began the negotiations on mutual force reductions in Central Europe.

As you know, U.S. force levels have declined substantially in the wake of these initiatives. Not only has the general purpose force structure now fallen well below the peak levels of 1968, it is actually smaller than it was in 1964. In other words, we maintain a much more modest defense establishment in 1974 than was considered necessary in peacetime only a decade ago. It is equally noteworthy, however, that the considerations which affect our defense planning are no less demanding. The sheer physical threats, as measured by the military capabilities of potential adversaries, have actually increased during the last 10 years. At the same time, so have our foreign interests, with expanded external investments, a larger volume of international trade, and growing dependence on raw materials from sources overseas. Meanwhile, our political commitments remain essentially constant, as do the capabilities of our allies.

To underline these developments, and particularly the decline in the U.S. defense posture, is not to imply disapproval of previous initiatives, although some of the force cuts may have gone too deep. Nor is it to pretend that, in real terms, we now have a small defense budget as a result of the reductions in our force structure. It is true, of course, that defense outlays are consuming a decreasing fraction of our gross national product (now less than 6 percent) and Federal revenues. It is also true that in constant FY 1975 prices, we are spending $8 billion less than in FY 1964, the last pre-Vietnam budget year. Nevertheless, by any measure, $85.8 billion is a large outlay. The Nation should understand, however, that the total looks so large—and is so large—compared with the $50.8 billion we were paying for defense in FY 1964 primarily because of four factors:



The USS California missile frigate slides down the ways at Newport News, Virginia. The FY 1975 budget calls for more new ships to be added to the fleet than are being retired from the fleet, thus increasing the number of general purpose ships from the 526 at the end of FY 1974.

	In FY 1975 (billions of current dollars)
• The remaining costs of Southeast Asia-related support;	$ 1.8
• The increase in military retired pay since FY 64;	4.8
• The growth in military and civil service pay and allowances since FY 64; and	21.1
• The effects of inflation on the purchase of goods and services since FY 1964	14.4
Total cost growth	$42.1

Were it not for these factors, we would be maintaining our baseline force structure—the posture we design for long-term, steady-state, peacetime purposes—for about $43.7 billion. However, inflation and real pay increases (not cost-of-living increases) granted prior to the end of the draft have been substantial since 1964.

Because our society decided on grounds of equity to make military and civil service pay comparable to remuneration in the private sector of the economy, the bill for defense has gone up by a large amount. Despite the resulting burden, I doubt that we would want to reverse earlier decisions and implicitly tax our military personnel for service to the country—with or without the draft. Instead, I believe we will

want to accept the fact that, because of truly national decisions in favor of equity—shared in by the executive and legislative branches alike—a unit of defense is now more expensive than it was 10 years ago. Whether we can bring these unit costs down, and whether we should consider reviving the draft at some future date, are separable issues that I shall discuss later in more detail.

Baseline Requirement

Because defense spending appears so high compared with the past, and because the international environment is less hostile, we have faced and will continue to undergo pressures to reduce our defense posture still further, to cut back unilaterally on our strategic offensive forces, and to thin out our baseline deployments overseas. Despite these pressures, I believe that we have already overshot the mark in previous reductions, and that, to the extent that we can expand the combat structure (particularly where the general purpose forces are concerned) without adding real costs, we should be authorized to do so. I have several grounds for this view.

This is the first peacetime defense budget in many years. Nevertheless, I would be remiss if I pretended that our need for military strength is substantially less than it was a decade ago, before our major deployments to Southeast Asia. It is true that our relationships with the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. have improved since then; Sino-Soviet differences are more visible; and we no longer think it so important to insure against simultaneous conflicts in Europe and Asia. But, as I have already indicated, the military capabilities of those nations in a position to threaten our interests have not declined, they have increased. There is, in fact, no evidence whatsoever that unilateral reductions induce reciprocity on their part. Considering the cuts we have already made, further reductions should now be dependent upon international agreement with potential adversaries. And, with SALT and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), we have created the mechanisms for just such hoped-for reductions. While we await their results, growth in the force structure brought about by increased military efficiency should not be denied us, especially since estimates of our baseline requirements are not precise to the last detail.

As I hardly need remind you, to move from a state of cold war through a condition of detente and improved diplomatic communication to an era of greater mutual trust and cooperation between East and West is an involved and lengthy process. It is particularly difficult when our negotiating partners in the enterprise are closed societies. As recent events in the Middle East have demonstrated, tests of will and resolution may be with us for some time to come, and military strength appropriately displayed will play a meaningful role in their resolution.

Furthermore, unlike the role circumstances and disposition allowed us to play prior to World War II, we now unavoidably have the leading part in the defense arrangements of the free world. There is no substitute among the other industrialized democracies for the power of the United States. Whereas prior to World War II the United States could serve as the arsenal of democracy and its great reserve force, now we constitute democracy's first line of defense. There is no longer any large and friendly shield of defenses behind which we can take two or more years to mobilize our forces. It is our own ready defenses that constitute so much of the deterrent shield.

Nor is that all. We must also recognize that large and abrupt changes in our posture and deployments could well produce major effects in the world—not only on the calculations of the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C., but also on the perspectives of our allies and on such long-term trends as nuclear proliferation. We are not the policeman of the world, but we are the backbone of free world collective security.

To summarize, this is not only the first defense budget of the post-Vietnam era; it is also the first defense budget for what President Eisenhower once called the long haul. Short of a sudden and dramatic improvement in the international environment, this means that we must provide offsetting power to the multiple capabilities of potential foes. Deterrence must operate across the entire spectrum of possible contingencies; we cannot afford gaps in its coverage that might invite probes and tests. As far ahead as we can see, a triad of strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear and conventional forces will be required.

In such circumstances, the force structure we propose for FY 1975 and the years that follow must rest on the concepts and methods that I have alluded to here. That is to say, U.S. interests, the potential threats to them, our commitments, the range of contingencies that might arise, allied capabilities, and our conception of the role we should play in world affairs, must continue to shape the defense posture and budget of the United States.

Resources and Programs

The President's budget proposal received on February 4 was developed within this overall context, and includes requests for both FY 1974 Supplementals —the result of pay and price increases and necessary readiness improvements— and the FY 1975 Budget.

The FY 1974 Supplemental requests total $6.2 billion in addition to the amounts already appropriated by the Congress, raising the proposed FY 1974 total obligation authority (TOA) to $87.1 billion. Of this supplemental amount, $3.4 billion is required for pay and rate increases. The balance of $2.8 billion is required to maintain the desired readiness level of U.S. forces.

This "readiness supplemental" is largely the result of our recent Middle East experiences and includes fuel price increases in the amount of $480 million. Also included are the extra costs of our arms supply to Israel, consisting of increased operations and maintenance costs and the additional costs for replacing in U.S. inventories the material provided to Israel. These extra costs amount to $231 million.

The supplemental request also reflects the most urgent deficiencies in the condition of our forces that were made apparent by the Middle East hostilities. With these things in mind, I have included $1,397 million to improve the readiness of our forces, $169 million to increase our airlift capability, and $516 million to buy certain high-value weapons and equipment which are now in short supply in our Services.

The readiness improvements include adding to our ammunition stocks, reducing the maintenance backlog on our ships and equipment, making sure pre-positioned equipment is ready for use, improving our defense suppression capabilities, and purchasing short-supply items important for overall readiness.

The airlift improvements I recommend are modest first steps in a more fundamental examination of our airlift capabilities, which I believe is necessary. These first steps include buying additional C-5 and C-141 spare parts, developing a stretched version of the C-141, and examining the possibilities for relatively inexpensive improvements to civil airlift to permit them to carry military cargoes in an emergency.

The FY 1975 budget request in TOA is $92.6 billion, an increase of $5.5 billion over FY 1974, and outlays for FY 1975 are estimated at $85.8 billion. This request is a substantial one, but I offer no apologies for it. It bears directly on whether or not the United States will continue to fulfill the responsibilities it has around the world. In real terms, moreover, it means doing no more than holding our own as compared to FY 1974, for the $5.5 billion increase is wholly consumed by pay and price increases. In fact, the FY 1975 budget in constant dollars is smaller than the FY 1964 budget of a decade ago. Similarly, the FY 1975 budget outlays continue for the second year to claim less than six percent of the gross national product—the lowest allocation of resources to Defense since FY 1950—and continue also the declining trend of Defense spending as a percent of total Federal budget, at 27.2 percent for FY 1975.

We do propose in the FY 1975 budget certain new emphases which are meant to insure that we have the ability to maintain in the future a worldwide equilibrium of military force. This requires that there be a stable balance of strategic forces, of general purpose forces—particularly in Central Europe—and of maritime forces. With this in mind, the FY 1975 program reflects these significant trends in our forces:

- We will continue to maintain the triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sub-launch ballistic missiles (SLBM) and bombers in our strategic forces, improving them and replacing them as appropriate, within the confines of the SALT I agreements.
- We will proceed with several strategic systems research and development programs which might serve either as replacements for existing allowed systems or as hedges against the uncertain results of SALT II.
- We will decrease our active air defense of the continental United States, reducing the number of air defense fighter squadrons and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) batteries. Without an effective antimissile defense, precluded to both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. by the ABM Treaty of 1972, a defense against Soviet bombers is of little practical value. We will, however, retain the capability to protect the sovereignty of our airspace and to defend against limited threats.
- We will continue improvements in our strategic command and control systems.
- In our general purpose force structure, we will halt, and in some areas reverse, the steady reductions that have occurred since 1968.
  - —We will increase the number of active Army divisions, from 13 to 13 1/3, add new battalions to existing understrength divisions, and convert certain infantry units into armored and mechanized units. We will do this within manpower authorizations, by making reductions in headquarters and support establishments.
  - —For the first time in many years, we will be adding more new ships to the fleet than we will be retiring from the fleet, thus reversing the trend that brought us from 979 general purpose ships in 1968 to 526 ships at the end of FY 1974.
- We will apply the lessons of the recent Middle East war, by giving high priority to programs such as modern antitank weapons; tanks; air defense of land forces and its opposite, defense suppression; improved munitions and more substantial stocks, aircraft shelters, and the like.
- We will improve our readiness by accelerating aircraft modifications and reworks, restoring ship overhaul schedules, and other maintenance.
- We will increase our total airlift and sealift capability, as far as possible through the use of existing resources, commercial as well as military, allied as well as our own, in order to be able to deploy divisions even more rapidly to Europe in an emergency.

Two soldiers operate the tank-killing TOW missile. The TOW—tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire command link guided missile—enables the United States foot soldier to destroy enemy tanks without calling for artillery or aircraft support. The TOW and the antitank missile Dragon are included in the principal procurement programs for FY 1975.

Chief procurement programs for strategic forces involve continuation of production of Minuteman II missiles at the minimum rate, completing SSBN conversion to Poseidon, and the continuation of Trident ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and air-launched missile programs. In addition, there are several research and development programs underway as replacements for existing systems allowed under SALT I or as hedges against the uncertainty of SALT II and the lapsing of the Interim Agreement.

These R&D initiatives include continued development of the B-1, advanced ICBM technology, the cruise missiles, advanced ballistic missile re-entry systems and technology (ABRES), and a new, smaller SSBN. No production decisions on these systems have been taken or are required this year. In addition we will complete deployment of Safeguard at Grand Forks, North Dakota, and continue our ABM technology development. We will not go ahead with antiballistic missile defense of the National Capital Area at the present time. Despite the enormous importance of strategic programs, TOA for FY 1975 comes to $7.6 billion, or only 8.4 percent of the total budget, at compared to a TOA in 1964 of $8.5 billion (16.7 percent of the budget).

The major land force procurement and development programs involve tank/anti-tank, air defense, surface-to-surface missiles and mobility systems. The principal procurement programs are the M60 tanks and Tow and Dragon antitank missiles on an accelerated schedule, the Sea-Cobra and Cobra-Tow attack helicopters, the improved Hawk surface-to-air missile system, and the Pershing and Lance surface-to-surface missile systems. The major development programs are for a new main battle tank, a mechanized



Included in the FY 1975 budget are initial procurement funds for the Air Force's A-10 close air support aircraft (above) and development funds for the lightweight fighter, both examples of inexpensive, capable systems tailored to particular missions against limited threats.

infantry combat vehicle, an advanced attack helicopter, testing of alternative mobile, short range air defense systems, and the continued development of a tactical transport and heavy lift helicopter.

In order to maintain naval forces of adequate size and capabilities for the future, in the face of obvious budgetary limitations, we are giving great emphasis in our FY 1975 programs to the high/low mix concept for our surface fleet. Accordingly, we look to the sea control ship and patrol frigate to take on tasks in lower threat areas previously undertaken by aircraft carriers and destroyers. We are also continuing in 1975 our emphasis on ASW capabilities, on acquiring an antiship missile (the Harpoon), and in pursuing new technology for the 1980s. The chief procurement programs are a continuation of the DD-963 destroyer program and the DLGN-38 nuclear frigates; the design and procurement of the sea control ship, the patrol frigate, carrier and land-based ASW aircraft and helicopters, antiship missiles, attack submarines, amphibious assault ships, and a number of supporting systems. For the longer term, we are exploring surface effect technology and its implication for our surface fleet.

Tactical air forces programs this year reflect the application of the high/low mix concept. Major procurement programs include the F-14A and F-15 which will replace a portion of the long-service F-4 tactical fighter. There will also be more of the latest versions of several Navy attack aircraft—the A-4M, A-6E and A-7E. We have included in the FY 1975 budget the initial procurement funds for the A-10 close air support aircraft, and development funds for new lightweight fighters, both examples of low cost but capable systems tailored to particular missions against limited threats. We also include funds for the initial procurement of 12 tactical airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, which are expected to improve in significant measure our ability to control tactical air operations and to provide long-range airborne surveillance and warning for our tactical air forces. Finally, we are giving greater emphasis in our FY 1975 procurement and development programs to systems that will locate, identify and suppress ground air defenses. In this regard, we will continue procurement of the EA-6B tactical jamming aircraft as well as a number of new development efforts.

We are not proposing new procurement programs for our mobility forces in FY 1975. Instead, we propose to make our existing forces more ready and capable of more extensive operations, by higher crew ratio and more certain availability of spare parts and the like. We also propose to modify all of the existing C-141 cargo aircraft to increase their capacity by about 30 percent. We are studying ways to identify and mobilize necessary shipping early in a crisis.

We are working with our allies to insure greater cooperation and availability of allied sealift resources in an emergency. We are also proposing in the FY 1975 budget to modify civilian aircraft in cooperation with U.S. commercial airlines in order that they might have the necessary capacity to meet the military cargoes requirements and be available in time of need. This, of course, is a much less expensive alternative than buying and maintaining our own larger airlift fleets. Our overall aim, underlined by the Middle East hostilities, is to improve substantially our strategic airlift capacity to deploy forces overseas swiftly in time of crisis.

Personnel for Defense

One side, and traditionally the less publicized side, of the Defense programs are the weapon systems and equipment programs I just discussed. The other and now more costly side is manpower. In FY 1975 we are aiming to maintain a peacetime deterrent force structure of sufficient size, quality and readiness by using our manpower more efficiently with particular emphasis on getting more combat capability by reducing headquarters and support structure. And we will continue programs to improve the quality of life in the Military Services.

These are formidable tasks. First, our force structure is much smaller than it has been in more than two decades, and smaller by almost 40 percent from the 1968 Vietnam peak. We cannot prudently allow it to shrink further. Moreover, we must take steps to increase our readiness and to continue to overcome

nagging deficiencies. Second, FY 1975 will complete the transition to the All Volunteer Force; and, despite our smaller active force, we still must recruit one of every three eligible and available men to man the force adequately. We will increase also recruiting of young women. Attracting and retaining a sufficient number of qualified individuals will perhaps be our most significant personnel test in FY 1975. We obviously will have to use our personnel resources more efficiently.

Third, we must improve the organization and readiness of the Reserve and National Guard so that they can assume their increasingly important role in our total security posture. And finally, we must do all of this at as low a cost as is possible, since manpower already consumes approximately 55 percent of the Defense budget and further increases would jeopardize both needed improvement in readiness and weapons development programs. It is clear not only that the best efforts of the Defense Department will be required to succeed, but also that we must have the active support of the Congress and the American people as well.

Doing our best to make the volunteer force work is one of our highest priorities. At the end of the first full year of operation of the volunteer concept, the Department of Defense has reached approximately 92 percent of its enlisted recruiting requirement. The Army, which requires the largest numbers of men, has reached roughly 89 percent of its needs, and has recently been meeting its monthly recruiting objectives. This is a favorable development, but obviously one which will bear continuing close scrutiny, especially in light of the requirement recently imposed by the Congress that at least 82 percent of all new enlistees be of average or above average mental ability and that at least 55 percent be high school graduates. Although the overall

A U.S. Army M-60A1 tank from the 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas, moves through a Federal Republic of Germany village during North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Exercise Reforger IV. The exercise involved nearly 40,000 troops, 10,000 of which were airlifted from the United States.

record for the Department of Defense this fiscal year has been 89 percent with respect to mental ability and 66 percent for high school graduates, it is expected that the high school graduate requirement will cause us some problems in meeting Army and Marine Corps recruitment goals. Given the uncertainty of the impact of this requirement, we are presently projecting a shortfall of between 10,000 and 20,000 in Army end strength at the end of this fiscal year. This would represent a 1.3 percent to 2.6 percent shortfall in Army end strength, a tolerable shortage.

I cannot say yet, despite the encouraging signs of the moment, whether the volunteer force ultimately will work. But it is far too early to entertain thoughts about returning to a system of conscription. Moreover, while cost is not the only factor in deciding between the volunteer force and the draft, I would caution that the cost savings associated with a return to the draft appear to be minimal unless the Congress unexpectedly alters the rule of comparability in military pay, a rule which was made on its own merits and which predates the decision to pursue a volunteer force.

New Directions

Looking ahead, I already have directed the addition of more deterrent options than we have previously had available for our strategic nuclear forces, and such modifications in targeting doctrine as might be necessary to achieve them. In an era of nuclear parity, we cannot and should not rely primarily on the threat of massive replies to deter the great variety of contingencies that could arise



The U.S. Navy nuclear-powered submarine USS Ray leaves Newport News, Virginia, for sea duty.

in a nuclear crisis. Our current force structure is such as to permit much greater flexibility in our contingency planning without any erosion of our assured destruction reserve.

But I stress that each step we take in the strategic field is designed to bolster deterrence, which remains the cornerstone of our strategic philosophy.

However, as I also have indicated, the size and character of our strategic nuclear forces could change significantly, depending on the outcome of SALT. We cannot now know the outcome of those negotiations and therefore I am proposing a number of research and development programs which would enable us to respond in kind in order to maintain the delicate balance of deterrence, should the Soviets decide to deploy a more efficient counterforce capability than they now deploy. We would prefer, of course, that neither side take this step. Instead, we would rather see the strategic forces reduced by mutual agreement. But we are determined to preserve an essential strategic equilibrium with the U.S.S.R. both in capabilities and in targeting options.

I also am devoting considerable time and attention to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to the future of our general purpose forces there. My purpose has been to begin a process aimed at achieving, over the next three years, two fundamental security objectives necessary to sustain an adequate defense posture:

- First, the construction of a satisfactory basis for maintaining an adequate overall NATO security posture for the long haul, including balanced forces with rational missions credible to our adversaries and ourselves.
- Second, an equitable adjustment of burdens to put United States participation in NATO, and the United States military presence in Europe, on a solid, durable foundation ac-



A North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) technician works on a cable installation at a NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) site. NADGE is the largest electronic defense project ever undertaken, extending from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern frontier of Turkey. (NATO Photo)

The U.S. Air Force F-15 (above) and the Navy's F-14A are major procurement programs included in the FY 1975 budget. These two aircraft will replace a portion of the long-service F-4 tactical fighter.

ceptable to both the United States Congress and public, and to our allies.

I believe we will be successful on both points.

Also, in our general purpose forces, we are aiming to reduce the support structure and strengthen our combat forces wherever possible. I believe we can make reasonable gains here without any sacrifice in essential command and support functions. I already have noted the additional Army units being raised in this way during this fiscal year. To make this program work, however, we must allow the Army, within its budget, the incentive of retaining the increased capability that it obtains by trading in support for more combat forces.

We have now had sufficient experience with our strategic airlift to demonstrate its high utility both in standard contingencies and in the more "off-design" cases for which we do not specifically buy forces. Furthermore, at an appropriate time in the future, strategic airlift will enable us to increase our Continental United States-based strategic reserve without any reduction in our support for forward defense in key areas of commitment. Strengthening the strategic reserve, in turn, will mean fewer forces tied to specific theaters and greater flexibility in their allocation during a crisis. We will be looking for opportunities to increase our airlift capability, and have included some of our ideas in the current budget.

Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements and I are pursuing the "fly-before-buy" and "Hi-Lo" policies initiated by Secretaries Laird and Packard to see whether we cannot further drive down unit costs on our more sophisticated weapons and at the same time substitute quantity for quality in a number of areas. In many situations, large numbers of relatively uncomplicated systems may prove more effective than equal-cost but much smaller numbers of highly complex delivery vehicles. As yet, however, I cannot give you a final recommendation on the precise mix of high and low technologies that we should have in such mission areas as interdiction and close air support, field army air defense, and sea control. We do have a number of programs already underway, such as the A-10, the patrol frigate and the sea control ship, which I believe are proceeding in the right direction.

In general, as we deal with these and other specific problems in our adjustment to a long haul posture, there are five basic principles which, in my view, should guide the future conduct of this department. They are that:

- The safety of the United States, its citizens, and their lawful pursuits continues to depend on the maintenance of a strong defense establishment. Accordingly, we who represent this department must not be reticent in stating the needs we have or the pride we feel in the performance of the duties for our Nation.
- We have the responsibility, not only to the United States itself but also to our friends throughout the world, to assure the military balance so necessary to deterrence and a more enduring peace. Other nations led in that responsibility for most of the first two centuries of our national existence; now the cloak of leadership unavoidably embraces us, and we must make the long-term effort to bear it.
- The men and women of the Department of Defense are without peers as servants of the Nation. It does not follow, however, that patriotism can proceed without respect. We must give them the respect, dignity and support that are their due. Equal opportunity will continue to be a DoD watchword,
- To stress our needs is not to ignore an equal obligation to use our citizens' resources wisely. We must continue to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our forces and to add to the arsenal of deterrence.
- We can and must become increasingly competitive with potential adversaries in a more fundamental sense. We must not be forced out of the market—on land, at sea or in the air. Eli Whitney belongs to us, not to our competitors. He, rather than the medieval craftsmen of Mont St. Michael and Chartres—however magnificent and unique their art—must once more become our model.

I cannot say at this juncture exactly what the long haul holds for this department. But I can say that unless we are to plan only by intuition, we must continue to build our peace structure on the hard facts of the international environment rather than on gossamer hopes for the imminent perfectability of mankind.

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